Security in QEMU
How Virtual Machines provide Isolation

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About me

Reviewer of CVE fixes

Participant in vulnerability disclosure process

QEMU contributor since 2010

Member of Red Hat’s virtualization team
QEMU Security Process

Found a security bug or not sure if it’s a security bug?

https://wiki.qemu.org/SecurityProcess

Please follow this process so fixes can be rolled out with minimal risk to users.
Use Cases and their Security Requirements

Many QEMU use cases exist

They have different security requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Toy kernel development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guest is trusted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>User is trusted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No internet access</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Which security requirements does QEMU fulfill?

Are they a superset of my use case’s requirements?
How do we agree on Security Requirements?

There can never be more than 10k LOC so auditing is easy

This won’t be exposed to the internet, let’s just merge it

Risky but quick to develop

Impractical but minimal risk

The community has a consensus that works for its participants

It evolves over time as people join or leave the project
QEMU’s Security Requirements

For virtualization use cases:
- Guest is untrusted
- User-facing interfaces are untrusted (e.g. remote desktop)
- Network protocols are untrusted
- User-supplied files are untrusted

Non-virtualization use cases are not backed by security claims
- TCG (just-in-time compiler) use cases rely on old unaudited code

(Check SecurityProcess wiki page for latest info if reading in future)
Fine-grained Security Support List needed?

Not all QEMU features are hardened and production-quality

Downstreams support a subset of features

Safe features may not be apparent to upstream newcomers

Wish: Let’s create a fine-grained “safe features” list
Architecture (QEMU, KVM/TCG, libvirt)

Management tools (libvirt)

Guest RAM

QEMU

Guest RAM

QEMU

Host userspace

Host kernel

Focus of this talk

kvm.ko

vhost_net.ko
QEMU Guest Isolation (1)

1. The guest must not gain control of QEMU

*Attack surfaces:*
- Device emulation
- TCG (not covered in this presentation)
QEMU Guest Isolation (2)

2. Must not gain access to other guests

Traditional attacks on other guests are possible over the network, but another vector exists if you gain control of QEMU.
QEMU Guest Isolation (3)

3. Must not gain control of host kernel
Defense in Depth

The virtualization stack consists of layers

Compromising one layer must not compromise the entire system

Makes it more challenging for an attacker
Securing the QEMU Process

Management tools (e.g. libvirt) should:
- Run QEMU as an unprivileged user
- Restrict the QEMU process using SELinux to prevent access to other guests’ disks or debugging them (ptrace)
- Configure resource controls on the QEMU process

Always check your management tool is doing this!
- If you run QEMU manually or with a custom tool, beware.
Theory: Principle of least Privilege

QEMU only has resources belonging to this specific guest

If guest escapes into QEMU it does not gain access to other resources!

When implemented perfectly, guest escape only provides access to the same resources as within the guest but with the native API.
Practice: Principle of least Privilege

Escaping into QEMU exposes native APIs unavailable in the guest

SELinux and seccomp reduce the host userspace attack surface, but restricting everything is hard
  • See Eduardo Otubo’s QEMU Sandboxing for Dummies talk

Escaping into QEMU may give access to storage network
  • Protect network disks with authentication (iSCSI, Ceph, etc)

Resource limits implemented by QEMU, like rate-limits, can be bypassed once QEMU is compromised
Recap: Principle of least Privilege

Design new features to only give QEMU access to resources belonging to the guest

Sometimes exceptions are necessary for practical reasons and this should be documented
Real-world QEMU Security Bugs

What do real bugs look like? How can they be prevented?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>CVE ID</th>
<th>CWE ID</th>
<th># of Exploits</th>
<th>Vulnerability Type(s)</th>
<th>Publish Date</th>
<th>Update Date</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Gained Access Level</th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>Complexity</th>
<th>Authentication</th>
<th>Conf.</th>
<th>Integ.</th>
<th>Avail.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CVE-2018-12617</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Overflow</td>
<td>2018-06-21</td>
<td>2018-06-23</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Remote</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Not required</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CVE-2018-110056</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Overflow</td>
<td>2018-06-13</td>
<td>2018-10-10</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Not required</td>
<td>Complete</td>
<td>Complete</td>
<td>Complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CVE-2018-78858</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>2018-03-12</td>
<td>2018-07-11</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Not required</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>CVE-2018-7550</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Exec Code</td>
<td>2018-03-01</td>
<td>2018-09-07</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Not required</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>CVE-2018-56883</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>2018-01-23</td>
<td>2018-09-07</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Local</td>
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The `vga_draw_text` function in QEMU allows local OS guest privileged users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and QEMU process crash) by leveraging improper memory address validation.

https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-7506/Qemu.html
CVE-2015-3456 – VENOM

Guest-triggerable buffer overflow in floppy disk controller code:

$ git show e9077462
@@ -2004,7 +2007,9 @@ static void fdctrl_write_data(...)
    FLOPPY_DPRINTF("%s: %02x\n", __func__, value);
-   fdctrl->fifo[fdctrl->data_pos++] = value;
+   pos = fdctrl->data_pos++;
+   pos %= FD_SECTOR_LEN;
+   fdctrl->fifo[pos] = value;
Device Emulation Security Checklist

1. C programming bugs (buffer overflows, use-after-free, etc)

2. Validate inputs from guest

3. Handle device accesses at unexpected moments or in an unusual order (e.g. submitting another request while one is pending)

4. Validate migration state upon load

5. Copy in guest memory (other vcpus race with your thread)
Other Attack Surfaces

User-facing interfaces are untrusted (VNC, SPICE)

Network protocols (WebSocket, NBD, etc)

User-supplied files (kernel images, disk images)
CVE-2017-14167 – multiboot loader

Kernel loader for multiboot files forgot to validate inputs

Heap buffer overflow triggered by malicious multiboot file

$ git show ed4f86e8

mbs.mb_buf = g_malloc(mb_kernel_size);

fseek(f, mb_kernel_text_offset, SEEK_SET);

if (fread(mbs.mb_buf, 1, mb_load_size, f) != Values from untrusted file
The HMP/QMP Monitor

Provides administrative access to guest

Same abilities as QEMU process to access files on host, etc

Do not expose the monitor directly to untrusted users!*

* Monitor white-list has been discussed as future solution
What can we learn from the bugs?

Many are Denial of Service and not memory corruption (good!)

Actually gaining access to other guests or host kernel requires additional steps → defense in depth

C coding bugs (integer overflows, buffer overflows, etc) are common
How do we improve QEMU Security? (1)

Finding bugs early

- Static analysis tools - already in use today
- Fuzzing attack surfaces – limited activity upstream
- Code audits – we have code review but no formal audit activity

(Remember bugs found in code for non-virtualization use cases may not be treated as security bugs)
How do we improve QEMU Security? (2)

Mitigating impact of bugs

- Sandboxing – what’s next after SELinux and seccomp?
- Multi-process QEMU – smaller processes can be sandboxed more effectively
- Modules – only load features as needed to reduce code available to exploits relying on return-oriented programming
- Compiling out features – for example `./configure --disable-tcg` is now possible!
How do we improve QEMU Security? (3)

Eliminating sources of bugs

- Using a “safe” programming language – Rust has been discussed
- Restricting ourselves to safe APIs – bounds-checked FIFO instead of open-coded C array
Get Involved

A lot of activity underway to improve security

Participate in approaches that interest you

Discuss on the QEMU mailing list <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>
Thank you!

My blog: https://blog.vmssplice.net/

IRC: stefanha on #qemu irc.oftc.net
CVE-2016-9602 – virtfs root directory escape

O_NOFOLLOW still follows symlinks in dirname

Malicious guests can provide a path with a symlink

@@ -359,13 +378,9 @@ static int local_closedir(...
 static int local_open(FsContext *ctx, ...
 {
- fd = open(buffer, flags | O_NOFOLLOW);
+ fd = local_open_nofollow(ctx, fs_path->data, ...